GROUNDWORK ON ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY 
IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERN WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

An Examination of Issues in Epistemology, Metaphysics, 
and Philosophy of Religion  BY MACKSOOD A. AFTAB B.A. 
Department of Philosophy University of Michigan, 
Ann Arbor 

CONTENTS 
Topics listed, accompanied by major philosophers discussed in each section.

	INTRODUCTION
	PHILOSOPHY AND ISLAM
	ANALYTICAL ARGUMENTS
	COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS
	TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS
	ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS
	ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
	PROBLEM OF EVIL
	ARGUMENTS FROM RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
	CONCLUSION
	BIBLIOGRAPHY

Note about the Research: This work is a culmination of one year (1998-1999) of research at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor and the International Islamic University, Malaysia. The author may be contacted at: aftab@umich.edu. All rights reserved. This paper has been published in Meteorite (A philosophy journal at the University of Michigan). It is being reviewed for possible publication at the Iqbal Academy, Pakistan and IIU, Malaysia. 


INTRODUCTION

Relative to Western philosophy, the field of Islamic philosophy has remained largely dormant for the past few hundred years. The rigor of intellectual thought in Islam has been lost and contemporary Muslim thinkers are faced with the enormous challenge of re-interpreting and integrating the tremendous intellectual achievements of the West with that of earlier Islamic thinkers and the Qur'ân (the Muslim holy book). This endeavor is of crucial importance to any new Islamic intellectual renaissance. With the rise of Western science and philosophy, serious new challenges have been posed to the very fundamental principles of epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics, espoused by the classical thinkers of Islam. These issues need to be addressed, as Muhammad Iqbal, perhaps the first modern Muslim philosopher to deal with these problems in any comprehensive manner, writes: “With the reawakening of Islam, therefore, it is necessary to examine, in an independent spirit, what Europe has thought and how far the conclusions reached by her can help us in the revision and if necessary, reconstruction, of theological thought in Islam.” (Iqbal 6) 

The current undertaking will by no means meet the challenge put forth by Iqbal. It will, however, attempt to at least lay out some of the issues in Islamic epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy of religion. The difficulty of studies in this field, is compounded by the fact that there is very little academic material available on Islamic philosophy, and much of it remains to be translated from their original languages. Even if translated, many of the issues in modern philosophy have changed over time and it is not clear how to relate the medieval debates with the modern ones. In short, there is a significant period of intellectual lapse on the Islamic side, between the middle ages and today. Despite these problems, there is a need to present intellectual thought in Islam in an easy to understand yet rigorous manner, that maybe contribute towards enhancing further studies between western and Islamic philosophy. Both traditions have much to gain from each other. It is important to understand the basic framework and essentials tools used by Islamic philosophers in order to critique and build upon their works. Modern western philosophy has already dismissed many of the claims of medieval thinkers. It is now worth evaluating if the earlier claims are worth of a reexamination.  It is peculiar that many of the modern western arguments have close analogues in the earlier Islamic thinkers. Some have suggested that perhaps, this shows the influence of Islamic thought on European thought. Many of the classic works of Islamic philosophy were translated into Latin from Arabic at the beginning of the European renaissance. These along with translated Greek manuscripts greatly impacted the development of western thought. This influence is best seen in the works of the likes of, Descartes and Acquinas. In anycase, I think, the material is best viewed as a progression of thought from the Greeks onto the Muslims and then to Europe, and not as two different and opposed points of view. There are three major, purely rational, arguments for the existence of God that have had a significant influence on the history of philosophy of religion. These are namely, the Cosmological, Teleological and Ontological arguments. Other arguments put
forth for the existence of God are the arguments from morality and probability. This paper will examine the three major arguments as they are presented in modern philosophy and compare them with arguments for the existence of God presented by ancient and modern Islamic philosophers. It will also attempt to clarify the role of philosophy in Islamic thought, and how Muslim philosophers have attempted to reconcile faith and reason.  The main argument against the existence of God, has been the problem of evil. This has posed many problems to the theist, and Islamic philosophy is only beginning to tackle the problem in western terms.  Another stream of arguments for God’s existence, recently proposed in contemporary western philosophy are the proofs from religious experience. This is a theme also present in Islamic philosophy and the second part of this project will examine this issue. 

GO TOP ....

PHILOSOPHY AND ISLAM
Philosophy is concerned with the fundamental questions about nature and reality. Al-Kindi called philosophy the most exalted science, since it dealt with issues which are universal. Al-Kindi (Alkindus, 800 – 873 CE) is recognized as the first Arab or Muslim philosopher. He defines philosophy as the love of wisdom, from the Greek words philo (friend) and sophia (wisdom). (Kindi 18-19)  Ibn Rushd (Averroes) goes a step further and states that the Qur'ân makes the study of philosophy obligatory upon all believers.
Ibn Rushd (Averroes, 1128 – 1198 CE) is considered a major Aristotelian Muslim and Spanish philosopher. He states that philosophy is nothing more than the study of beings and reflection upon them. The Qur'ân encourages mankind to “Reflect, you have vision.” At another place it states, “have they not studied the kingdom of the heavens and the earth and whatever things God has created?” Here God is urging the readers to study the world and how and why objects and beings exist. Ibn Rushd concludes that God requires man to try to obtain demonstrative knowledge of His existence. But prior to having demonstrative knowledge, Man must be able to have dialectical, theoretical and logical knowledge. That is for man to learn he must know the basis of reasoning. Hence, philosophy is not only necessary but also commanded by the divine. (Ibn Rushd 44-46)  Al-Ghazzali finds serious problems with the philosophers of his era. He writes, “they have abandoned all the religious duties of Islam imposes on its followers.” He thinks that the kind of reasoning used by philosophers would never result in the proof of the existence of God. Al-Ghazzali (Algazel, 1058 – 1111 CE) was an extremely influential orthodox Muslim thinker who rebuffed many of the claims of the ‘philosphers’ who claimed they could proof God by reason alone. Ibn Rushd admits that philosophy may have its harms as a discipline, but these harms are no greater than those resulting from the study of medicine or law. Since, the study of philosophy is commanded by God Himself, it is obligatory, although it is possible to misuse the science for other purposes. (Ibn Rushd 47). As Al-Kindi and most Muslim philosophers agree philosophy cannot reach as far as revelation can. Hence, the basis of our actions should be based upon Islam, whereas philosophy ought to be considered as an independent discipline. It should also be noted that the thrust of Ghazzali’s argument is not against philosophy, but rather its use. His main concern is that the philosophers are drawing conclusions from their ‘arguments’ that are not valid.  Muhammad Iqbal sees no contradiction between faith and reason. Iqbal (1877-1938 CE) in this century is considered the poet-philosopher of Islam, his works have been extremely influential in the revival of Islamic thought. He was born in (what is now) Pakistan but studied in Britain and Germany, thus providing insight into both philosophical traditions. He thinks that both thought and intuition arise from the same source and don’t oppose each other, but rather are complimentary. Reason aims at understanding the physical world and existence, whereas religious experience aims at transcending this world and achieving the knowledge of the ultimate. Iqbal then thinks that it is necessary for Muslims to engage themselves in the study and science of philosophy in order to redefine Islamic culture, which is now confronted with a more advanced western civilization. If Muslim thinkers fail in this challenge, then Muslim thought may be absorbed by Western philosophy, as the two cultures begin to integrate further.  This debate is not uniquely Islamic, similar debates have persisted in Christian thought as well. While religious tensions in Europe were hindering analytical thought, it was flourishing in Muslim lands. As the Churches influenced decreased a more dynamic movement emerged in Europe brining with it a whole new worldview moving towards reason and away from dogma. 
Today many Christian theologians also use philosophy to justify their positions, as is similar among certain Muslim groups. The irritating problem, however, is to uphold the conclusion of these Atheists on purely philosophical grounds, in the face of a challenge from radical skepticism. 

GO TOP ....

COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS
The cosmological argument was first introduced by Aristotle and later refined in western Europe by the celebrated Christian theologian, Thomas Aquinas (d.1274 CE). In the Islamic tradition, it was adopted by Al-Kindi, and Ibn Rushd (Averroes). The argument has several forms, the basic first-cause argument runs as follows.  Every event must have a cause, and each cause must in turn have its own cause, and so forth. Hence, there must either be an infinite regress of causes or there must be a starting point or first cause. Aquinas and Al-Kindi reject the notion of an infinite regress and insist that there must be a first cause, and the first cause must be God, the only uncaused being. Another form of this argument is based on the concept of a prime-mover. This is the Aristotelian form of the argument also propounded by Averroes. The premise being that, every motion must be caused by another motion, and the earlier motion must in turn be a result of another motion and so on. The conclusion thus follows that there must be an initial prime-mover, a mover that could cause motion without any other mover.  Two kinds of Islamic perspectives maybe considered with regard to the cosmological argument. An positive Aristotelian response strongly supporting the argument and a negative response which is quite critical of it. Among the Aristotelian thinkers are Al-Kindi, and Averroes. Al-Ghazzali and Iqbal maybe seen as being in opposition to this sort of an argument.  Al-Kindi is one of the many major and first Islamic philosophers who attempt to introduce an argument for the existence of God based upon purely empirical premises. In fact, his chief contribution is the Cosmo- logical argument (dalil al-huduth) for the existence of God, in his On First Philosophy. (Nasr 168) He presents four different versions of this argument, all are variation of the cosmological argument which require a cause.  One of the arguments revolves around the principle of determination (tarjjih), that is prior to the existence of the universe it was equally likely for it to exist or not to exist. The fact that it exists, implies that it required a determining principle which would cause its existence to prevail over non-existence. This principle of determination is God. (Kindi 58) This is similar to Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason (Russell 568) (Cassierer 73) Leibniz argues that everything in the world is contingent that it may or may not have existed. Something will not exist unless there is a reason for its existence. This rests on his premise that the actual world is the best possible world, as such we can account for everything in it as being there for a specific reason. But the universe as a whole, requires a further reason for existence, and that reason for Liebniz is God. It should be noted that Liebniz’ theory of the best possible world is flawed. We can conceive of a better world than any possible ‘best’ world that can be created. An additional unit of pleasure or goodness can be added to it to make it better. Therefore, it seems implausible to think that a ‘best possible world’ could ever exist. There are difficulties with this kind of an account of the universe. It seems to lead to the conclusion that all truths are necessary. That is, if everything exists because the reasons for its existence supercede the reasons for it non-existence, then it will necessarily exist. Everything and anything with a sufficient reason to exist will exist. Therefore, the universe and everything in it, must necessarily exist. Since, the superiority of its potential existence over its non-existence provides the required determining principle (of Kindi) or sufficient reason (of Liebniz), for it to exist. It appears now that the bringing into being of the universe is not contingent upon the will of God, rather it is something that is as necessary as the existence of God Himself.  This seems implausible. In response Liebniz argues that its existence is only theoretically necessary and God may or may not implement it. However, if God is all good, He would clearly be obliged to bring into being the best possible world. (Sosa 515). 
A second argument of his draws its inspiration from Islamic and Aristotelian sciences. He argues that only God is indivisible, and everything other than God is in some way composite or multiple. Kindi describes his concept of God, He has no matter, no form, no quantity, no quality, no relation; nor is He qualified by any of the remaining categories (al-maqulat). He has no genus, no differentia, no species, no proprium, no accident. He is immutable… He is, therefore, absolute oneness, nothing but oneness (wahdah). Everything else must be multiple. (Sharif 429) 

This for Kindi was a crucial distinction upon which he rested some of his main arguments for God’s existence. In Kindi’s theory only God’s oneness is necessary whereas that of all others is contingent upon God. Hence all other beings single or multiple must emanate from the ultimate essential being. In addition this first being must be uncaused, since it is the cause of everything else. (Fakhry 78)  The material world cannot exist ad infinitum because of the impossibility of an actual infinite (a concept borrowed from Aristotle). The material world can also not be eoipso eternal, because of the impossibility of an infinite duration of time, since the existence of time is contingent upon the existence of bodies and motion, which have been shown to be finite. As such the world requires a creator, or rather a generator (mudhith) in Kindi’s scheme, who could generate the world exnihilo. (Fakhry 74-79) The other arguments he presents are similar versions of the first cause argument, and hence are subject to the same criticisms that apply to any cosmological argument. These criticisms come not only from western scholars but also Islamic ones.  Ghazzali is unconvinced by the first-cause arguments of Kindi. In response to them he writes,  According to the hypothesis under consideration, it has been established that all the beings in the world have a cause. Now, let the cause itself have a cause, and the cause of the cause have yet another cause, and so on ad infinitum. It does not behoove you to say that an infinite regress of causes is impossible. (Tahafut 90-91) 

Ghazzali thought that it is at least theoretically possible for there to be an infinite regress, and that there is nothing that necessitates a first-cause simply by pure deductive reason. He thus undermines one of the essential premises of the first-cause argument. Muhammad Iqbal also rejects the argument stating, “Logically speaking, then, the movement from the finite to the infinite as embodied in the cosmological argument is quite illegitimate; and the argument fails in toto.” For Iqbal the concept of the first uncaused cause is absurd, he continues: It is, however, obvious that a finite effect can give only a finite cause, or at most an infinite series of such causes. To finish the series at a certain point, and to elevate one member of the series to the dignity of an un-caused first cause, is to set at naught the very law of causation on which the whole argument proceeds. 

It is for these reasons that modern philosophers almost unanimously reject the cosmological argument as a legitimate proof for the existence of God. Kant for example also rejects any cosmological proof on the grounds that it is nothing more than an ontological proof in disguise. He argued that any necessary object’s essence must involve existence, hence reason alone can define such a being, and the argument becomes quite similar to the ontological one in form, devoid of any empirical premises.  Al-Kindi’s argument has been taken up by some contemporary western philosophers and dubbed the Kalam Cosmological Argument. Kalam being the Islamic science of dialectical reasoning. Among its chief proponents today is Dr. William Craig. (Ramey). It proposes to show, contrary to what Ghazzali thought, that the universe must have necessarily had a beginning. A contrast is drawn between two concepts, the “potential infinite” and an “actual infinite.” A potential infinite is a concept of an infinite series, to which more things can be added. For example, there maybe and infinite number of integers, however in any one set there will be a finite number of them. An “actual infinite” would be a set which would contain all possible integers. This would be impossible, since there are an infinite number of integers. Once a set is defined, another integer can always be found to add to it. They can never actually exist. Ramey quotes a famous mathematician David Hilbert: 
… the actual infinite is nowhere to be found in reality. It neither exists in nature nor provides a legitimate basis for rational thought—a remarkable harmony between being and thought… This forms an essential part of the argument, it demonstrates that an infinite regress could not exist, and that the universe can not possibly be actually infinite, in and of itself. The argument goes on to show that if the universe could not be actually infinite or eternal, given the principle of causality, it must have a first-cause or creator, which is God. Now, it maybe argued, that if an actual infinite cannot exist, then how can God exist? Since the concept of God, is one of an uncaused and infinite being. Al-Kindi’s answer is quite interesting. He states that it is not fair to ask this question of God, since God is not an “actual infinite.” God is not a set or collection of things, He is one. God is an absolute unity, and hence on Al-Kindi’s scheme God should not be thought of as an ‘infinite’ (Fakhry 77). It is not clear, however, if the Kalam argument successfully shows the impossibility of an infinite, a common response (which is also offered by Avicenna) has been to point out that there is no problem imagining an infinite that begins at the present and continues into the future, so it follows that it is entirely conceivable for the same infinity to continue in the past as well. (Sharif 503). Contemporary supporters of this argument have reformulated the first-cause argument to take away the difficulty of explaining
why an infinite regress would be impossible. Hicks explains, “they interpret the endless series that it excludes, not as a regress of events back in time, but as an endless and therefore eternally inconclusive regress of explanations.” Thus a move is made from an infinite regress of events to an infinite regress of explanations. That is, if events can be explained with reference to other events there must be an ultimate reality of self-explanatory events behind this complex that would make the collective set comprehendible. Hence, no longer is a creator being sought, rather given the creation an ultimate reality is being sought which would explain, or make sense of, the complex and plethora of phenomena in the world. Even here, the non-atheistic skeptic will ask what reason do we have to think that the universe is not simply an “unintelligible brute fact”? (Hick 21). 

GO TOP ....

TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS
The version of the argument from design is best known in contemporary philosophy as presented by William Paley (1805) in his Natural Theology. He presents us with an analogy of a watch. Suppose that while walking in a deserted remote location one comes across a watch. Upon examining this device one may ask themselves how did this object come into existence. Surely it could not be by pure chance, it is composed of intricate and complex internal design. We are likely to think that it was a product of an intelligent designer. i.e. there must be a watchmaker. In the same way Paley argues that the universe is much
more complex and manifestly designed. The extraordinary design is evident from planets and galaxies at the cosmic level to human cells and atoms at the quantum level. Therefore this world must have an intelligent creator. This form of the argument can be seen as an inference to the best explanation. That is given the remarkable phenomena of the universe, the best possible explanation for this, must be the existence of God. Elliot Sober explains this in terms of the Likelihood Principle, which he defines as: (Sober 31-33) 
O strongly favors H1 over H2 if and only if H1 assigns to O a probability that is much bigger than the probability that H2 assigns to O. Here O is an observation, and H is a hypothesis. The likelihood may be mathematically written as: [P (O/H)]. The probability of the observation given the hypothesis. The principle in probability theory form would state that: O strongly favors H1 over H2 if and only if P(O/H1) >> P(O/H2). This Sober makes clear is not to be confused with the Probability Principle which states can be written as [P (H/O)]. These are two importantly distinct principles, Sober gives an example of the observation (O) that while sitting in a cabin one hears rumblings in the attic. On the basis of this one forms the hypothesis (H) that there are gremblins in the attic and they are bowling. Now it is clear that the P (O/H) is very high, that is, if there were gremblin’s bowling (H) the likelihood of the rumbling noise (O) would be quite high. But P (H/O) in this case is very low. Since given the rumbling noise (O), the probability of the explanation being bowling gremblins (H) is small. “The gremblin hypothesis has a high likelihood but a low probability given the noises we hear.” (Sober 32). The likelihood principle a much better way to understand the inference to the best explanation, since in the case of God a hypothesis is being formed on the basis of observations, in the teleological sense. Paley, according to Sober, is attempting to apply the likelihood principle to the watch example. That is given that the watch is intricate and well-designed for time-keeping (O), the inference that it was designed by an intelligent creator (H1) is higher than the conclusion that it came into being via random natural processes. Symbolically written it would state: P(O/H1) >> P(O/H2). Paley next argues that if one accepts the above reasoning one is then obliged to accept the reasoning he gives for the universe as a whole. which is as follows: O: The world is intricate and well-designed for the purpose of supporting life. H1: The world is the product of an intelligent designer. H2: The world is the product of random physical processes. 

Given the above, Again Paley’s claim would be that: P(O/H1) >> P(O/H2). Both of the above are inferences to the best explanation on the basis of the likelihood principle outlined earlier. (Sober 33). Sober later rejects the notion presented by Paley, and argues that the likelihood of an evolutionary hypothesis supersedes the likelihood of a creationist hypothesis. Al-Kindi also attempts to make reference to the teleological proof (dalil al-‘indyah) for the existence of God. As he argues that “the orderly and wonderful phenomena of nature could not be purposeless and accidental” (Kindi 61) This is consistent with the Qur'ânic verse “Not for (idle) sport did We create the heavens and the earth and all that is between!” (Yusuf Ali, Qur'ân 21:16) 
The teleological argument analyses the material world and infers from it an Artificer or a creator, a self-conscious being of unlimited intelligence and power, who created this extremely complex world for a purpose and that creator is God. Muhammad Iqbal once again criticizes this argument in the following terms: At best, it [teleological proof] gives us a skillful external contriver working on a pre-existing dead and intractable material the elements of which are, by their own nature, incapable of orderly structures and combinations. The argument gives us a contriver only and not a creator; and even if we suppose him to be also the creator of his material, it does no credit to his wisdom to create his own difficulties by first creating intractable material, and then overcoming its resistance by the application of methods alien to its original nature. The designer regarded as external to his material must always remain limited by his material and hence a finite designer... (Iqbal 24) 

Iqbal is pointing out that any argument from design rests on the extraordinary complexity and almost perfect arrangement of the universe, so as to compel the observer to infer that there must be an intelligent designer. This is consistent with the watchmaker example presented by Paley. The two cases, the watch and the universe, are however, different. Unlike the case of the watch, where its builder put the complex machine together given pre-existing material, the universe and its material itself created by God also. That is, there is no point in finding it extra-ordinary that God would be able to organize pre-existing “intractable” material in such an elegant fashion. The only reason we would have of thinking so, would be if it was a difficult task to design the universe. But then why would God, first create a difficult task for Himself and then go on resolve the difficulty by arranging into a sophisticated pattern? In addition, God would be limited in what He could create by this pre-existing material. This, to Iqbal, does not seem consistent with the Islamic concept of an omnipotent God. Iqbal writes, perhaps in response to Paley, “There is really no analogy between the work of the human artificer and the phenomena of Nature.” (Iqbal 24) Bertnard Russell joins in this criticism, commenting on the teleological explanation he professes, But if a man is so obstinately teleological as to continue to ask what purpose is served by the creator, it becomes obvious that his question is impious. It is, moreover, unmeaning, since, to make it significant, we should have to suppose the Creator created by some super-Creator whose purposes He served. (Russell 85) 

Both Iqbal and Russell point out that it is inappropriate for a person who believes in God to put forth an argument for His existence on teleological grounds. The British philosopher David Hume also rejected the teleological argument, for different reasons. For him the argument from the best explanation is an inductive argument, and Hume had argued that inductive knowledge and causation is not possible. Hume rejected all teleological works and claimed that they fail certain philosophical tests. He contended that metaphysical knowledge was not possible by either abstract or experimental reasoning. The problem of induction argues that it is impossible to make a justified inference from the observed to the unobserved. This is applicable to all such inferences. An example of such an inference is the following: we observe that “the sun rises everyday and has risen everyday for over several thousand years” on the basis of this observation we make an inference that: “Hence that the sun will rise tomorrow”. Hume claims that we are not at all justified in such an assumption. He asks what makes such an inference justifiable?  Hume recognizes that we spontaneously make such an inference and that perhaps we have no control over it. But he is asking what is our justification for this supposed causal relationship? He asserts where is the causal glue that links the rising of the sun yesterday to the rising of the sun tomorrow?  The only argument that can be made in support of it is that “Nature is uniform”. i.e. Nature has been uniform and will remain uniform thus we are justified in making inferences to unobserved events on the basis of what we have been observing. However, it must be noted that this argument in itself is an inductive one and begs

GOTOP